CERCLA Cost Recovery Suits: A Suit against an Insured for Damages under a Comprehensive General Liability Policy by Buse, Jennifer
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 14 | Issue 4 Article 3
1988
CERCLA Cost Recovery Suits: A Suit against an
Insured for Damages under a Comprehensive
General Liability Policy
Jennifer Buse
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Buse, Jennifer (1988) "CERCLA Cost Recovery Suits: A Suit against an Insured for Damages under a Comprehensive General
Liability Policy," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 14: Iss. 4, Article 3.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol14/iss4/3
CERCLA COST RECOVERY SUITS: A SUIT AGAINST
AN INSURED FOR DAMAGES UNDER A
COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY
POLICY
The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA) was enacted to facilitate prompt cleanup of hazardous waste
disposal sites while imposing liability on those responsible for the contamination.
Whether comprehensive general liability insurance provides coverage for CER-
CLA liability has become a rigorously litigated issue across the country as insur-
ers have asserted numerous defenses to coverage. This Note explores the insurer's
defense that this insurance does not cover CERCLA liability because it does not
constitute "damages" within the meaning of a CGL policy. The author ana-
lyzes complicated contract interpretation issues as well as policy questions to sup-
port the position that the motivating concern should be enforcement of the policy
of CERCLA.
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INTRODUCTION
The most controversial environmental law issue of the decade is
the enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).I A key objective of
CERCLA is to impose liability for cleanup costs on persons involved
in the transportation, storage, disposal and generation of hazardous
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-75 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
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wastes at currently inactive waste disposal. facilities. 2 Under CER-
CLA, liability is predicated upon the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) designation of responsible party status on a pol-
luter.3 Actual liability arises whenever the EPA spends Superfund
money to clean up a hazardous waste site when a responsible party
fails to do so.4 CERCLA provides that a responsible party may be
held strictly liable for past activities associated with the hazardous
waste.5 Federal courts have consistently held that where the harmful
effects of hazardous waste activities by more than one responsible
party are indivisible, CERCLA liability can also be joint and several. 6
CERCLA provides the EPA and private entities with various reme-
dies against responsible parties. First, CERCLA authorizes the EPA
to sue the responsible party for the loss in value to the environment
2. See id. § 9607(a)(2)-(4).
3. See Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App.
3d 127, 130, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1232 (1984) (responsible party status means that the
EPA has determined that the party is liable for the cleanup of a hazardous waste site).
4. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
5. See United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp.
984, 991 (D.S.C. 1986). Once the requisite connection between the party and the
waste site as described in 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(l)-(4) is established, the party is
strictly liable for EPA response costs. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a). The party will not be
held liable, however, if it can prove that, under the defenses enumerated in 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(1)-(4), the release or threat of release of hazardous substances
was caused solely by unrelated persons or events. The defenses to strict liablity are:
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of
the defendant, or other than one whose act or omission occurs in connec-
tion with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the
defendant (except where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a
published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by rail), if
the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he
exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, tak-
ing into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in
light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions
against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the conse-
quences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the forgoing paragraphs.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b) (West 1987).
6. See, e.g., South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. at 999,following
United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (joint and several
liability is determined on case by case basis and turns on whether or not harm is
divisible and there is a reasonable basis for apportionment of damages); United
States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (court may
order joint and several liablity whenever a defendant could not prove his contribu-
tion to an injury, however, a court could still apportion damages according to the
Gore amendment). The Gore amendment set four criteria for determining whether
or not joint and several liability should be imposed on a responsible party but was
not passed by the Senate. See generally Comment, Generator Liability Under Superfund for
Clean-up of Abandoned Hazardous Waste Dumpsites, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1229, 1269-1278
(1982) (discussing the Gore amendment and damage apportionment criteria).
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caused by the contamination.7 Second, CERCLA authorizes private
parties to clean up a hazardous waste site and sue either the
Superfund or the responsible party for the cleanup costs.8 Third,
CERCLA authorizes the EPA to take direct action, against responsi-
ble parties. This Note will focus on this third remedy under the fol-
lowing CERCLA authority: (1) direct EPA cleanup under CERCLA
Section 104 followed by an EPA cost recovery suit against responsi-
ble parties under CERCLA Section 107;9 or (2) an EPA suit to re-
cover cleanup costs after the responsible party fails to comply with
an order directing the responsible party to initiate cleanup opera-
tions under CERCLA Section 106.10
If the responsible party fails to clean up the hazardous waste site as
directed by the EPA, CERCLA grants the EPA broad authority to
clean up the site and recover its cleanup costs from the responsible
parties. I I The EPA's broad authority includes the power to recover
costs for investigation, testing, evaluation as well as the actual re-
moval of the waste and future maintenance and monitoring of the
site.12 A responsible party who is sued by the EPA for cleanup costs
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (Supp. III 1987). A responsible party who is liable
for damages for injury or destruction of natural resources may also be liable for the
reasonable costs incurred in assessing the damage. Id.
8. See id. §§ 9112(a); § 9607(a)(4) (B) (the term "private party" also includes
local governments). If the private party sues the responsible party directly for
cleanup costs, it is not necessary that the site be listed on the NPL. See also Cadillac
Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1988) (inclu-
sion on the NPL is not a precondition for a section 107 action seeking recovery of
response costs from sources other than the Superfund).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1983 & Supp. III 1987). When a hazardous substance is
released or there is a substantial threat of release, the President is authorized to initi-
ate cleanup operations under Section 104. The President has delegated most of this
authority under CERCLA to the EPA. Section 107 is the vehicle by which the federal
government or a particular state replenishes the Superfund for cleanup costs it ex-
pends. See id. § 9607.
In order to recover cleanup costs, the EPA must establish the following: (1) the
costs incurred were "response" costs as defined at id. § 9601(25); (2) the defendants
fall under the category of persons who can be held liable pursuant to id. § 9607(a)(l)-
(4); (3) the EPA responded to a "release" or "threatened release" as defined at id.
§ 9601(22); (4) the substance released was a "hazardous substance" as defined at id.
§ 9601(14); (5) the release was from a facility as defined at id. § 9601(9). See Frank
and Atkeson, Superfund: Litigation and Cleanup, at 33-57 (BNA Special Report) (1985).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1983 & Supp. III 1987). The EPA is authorized under
Section 106 to file suit to enforce its directive ordering responsible parties to intitiate
cleanup operations. See id. § 9606(b)(1).
11. See Kaplan, Balloun and Stigall, Defense Strategies and Insurance Coverage Issues in
a "Superfund" Case, 53 INs. COUN. J. 554, 555 (1986) (describing methods by which
EPA can recover hazardous waste site cleanup costs).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (Supp. III 1987). Courts generally construe the
EPA's right to recover costs broadly and hold that the burden of proving that the
costs are not recoverable is on the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 747-48 (8th Cir. 1987), (EPA may
1988]
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or for noncompliance with an EPA cleanup order may also be liable
for the EPA's litigation expenses.' 3 If the responsible party is a
property owner, the amount for which a responsible party is liable
may constitute a lien against his real property.' 4 Finally, the EPA
may request that treble damages be assessed against a responsible
party who fails to comply with a Section 104 cleanup request and is
later sued by the EPA for cleanup costs.' 5 Failure to comply with a
Section 106 cleanup order may result in a civil penalty of $25,000
per day for each day the violation occurs.' 6
It is not surprising that many insureds have tendered the defense
of an EPA cost recovery action under CERCLA Sections 104, 106
and 107 to their Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) carrier.' 7
Likewise CGL carriers typically deny coverage under one or more of
the following theories:
1. The pollution does not constitute an "occurence" under the
meaning of the policy;' 8
recover litigation costs, attorney's fees, future response costs and prejudgment inter-
est) rev'd on other grounds, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988).
13. See Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 747-48.
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l)(1) (Supp. III 1987). The lien attaches when response
costs are first incurred by the United States government or at the time that the prop-
erty owner first received notice of his potential liablity, whichever is later. See id.
§ 9607(l)(2).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1983). CERCLA § 107(c)(3) provides that any
person who fails without sufficient cause to undertake remedial or removal action as
requested by the EPA may be liable for up to three times the amount that was ex-
pended from the Superfund to respond to the hazardous condition. Id.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (Supp. III 1987).
17. Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) insurance provides coverage for in-
jury to third persons or property owned by someone other than the insured. See infra
text accompanying note 93. The insurer has several options for responding to an
environmental damage claim made pursuant to a CGL policy. The insurer may deny
coverage, assume the defense, file a declaratory judgment action or proceed to de-
fend the insured subject to a reservation of rights. See 7C APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 4683 at 54 (1979); see also Dohoney, The Liability Insurer's Duty to De-
fend, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 451 (1981); Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental
Damage Claims, 15 FORUM 551 (1980) (additional information regarding the insurer's
duty to defend).
18. The standard CGL policy covers liability for damages caused by an "oc-
curence." Occurrence is defined as "an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the Insured .... City of Carter Lake
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1056 (8th Cir. 1979). Courts have
reached different conclusions regarding the existence of an "occurrence" in s:ases
involving disposal of hazardous wastes. See, e.g., American States Ins. Co. v. Mary-
land Casualty Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549, 1553 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (occurrence does not
include intentional acts that cause environmental damage, when the damage is unin-
tentional); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chem. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d
127, 131-32, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1232-33 (1984) ("occurrence" is broader than "acci-
dent" and includes unintended results of intended acts). When there is continuous
[Vol. 14
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2. There was no occurrence within the policy period;19
3. The pollution exclusion clause in the policy precludes
coverage; 2
0
4. Pollution damage does not constitute property damage within
the meaning of the policy;21
5. The completed operations exclusion in the policy precludes
coverage; 22 and
6. No coverage exists because cleanup costs are not damages
within the meaning of a CGL policy.23
This Note will focus on the last theory: Whether the cleanup costs
seepage or occurrence, the majority of the courts appear to take the view that the
"per occurrence" language is to be construed from the point of view of the cause of
the accident, rather than its effect. See, e.g., Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v.
Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990, 994 (App.
Div. 1982) (if there was but one proximate, uninterrupted and continuing cause
which resulted in all of the injuries and damages, then there was one single
occurrence).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 93-99 (courts have advanced conflicting
theories for determining when an occurrence triggers liability under a CGL policy).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 100-108 (courts have advanced conflicting
theories in determining whether the pollution exclusion precludes coverage or the
pollution exclusion is ambiguous and thus has no effect on coverage).
21. Under a standard CGL policy, property damage is "injury to or destruction
of tangible property." See Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co. Ltd., 804 F.2d 1325,
1327 (4th Cir. 1986). Courts have reached different conclusions as to whether or not
EPA response costs are covered. Compare id. at 1329 (CERCLA response costs are
economic damages) with United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich App.
579, 589-90, 336 N.W.2d 838, 843 (1983) (response costs for abatement of
threatened release are property damages).
22. The completed operation and product hazard exclusion is meant to be a limi-
tation on coverage for accidents due to defective workmanship occurring after the
completion of work by the insured on a construction or service contract. Courts
agree that this exclusion does not preclude coverage in an environmental damage
case because unlike products liability cases, CERCLA liability arises by being a gener-
ator, transporter or operator of a waste site, and not upon proof of a defective condi-
tion. See Buckeye Union Ins., 17 Ohio App. 3d at 135, 477 N.E.2d at 1236.
23. The typical CGL policy provides that:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of: Coverage A.
bodily injury or Coverage B. property damage to which this insurance ap-
plies. caused by an occurrence, and the company shall have the right and
duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of such bod-
ily injury or property damage ....
Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1327 (emphasis added).
The issue is whether or not the cost of a cleanup or abatement of a threatened
release are damages within the meaning ofa CGL policy. Insurers argue that an EPA
cost recovery suit under CERCLA Sections 104 and 107 seeks equitable relief be-
cause the damage sought, the cost of cleanup, is "restitution." Damages under a
CGL policy mean compensation for loss in value to property, not restitution to re-
turn the environment to its status quo. Therefore, equitable cleanup costs are not
recoverable under a CGL policy. See infra text accompanying notes 109-25.
1988]
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incurred by the EPA are damages within the meaning of a CGL pol-
icy. Part I of this Note will discuss authority granted to the EPA
under CERCLA to recover cleanup costs and the nature of cleanup
costs. Part II of this Note will discuss the CGL policy and the cover-
age issues created by the EPA's administration of CERCLA's cleanup
costs recovery provisions. This section will also discuss recent case
law on the issue of an insurer's duty to defend and/or indemnify its
insured for CERCLA cleanup costs and whether the cost to clean up
a hazardous waste site constitutes damages within the meaning of a
CGL policy. Finally, this Note will conclude that EPA cleanup cost
recovery actions should constitute "damages" because of overriding
policy reasons.
I. BASIS OF AUTHORITY FOR EPA INITIATED CLEANUPS OR
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER CERCLA
CERCLA encourages the EPA to cooperate with state and local
governmental authorities to develop a means for discovering and
cleaning up hazardous waste sites.24 Commonly, a state environ-
mental agency will agree to perform services for the EPA such as
conducting site assessments, performing remedial investiga-
tion/feasibility studies and selecting the appropriate response ac-
tion.25 Although many states have enacted legislation similar to
24. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1987) (EPA must notify the state of results
of investigations and coordinate assessments and planning for response action with
the state); id. § 9621(f) (setting forth criteria EPA must use to develop standards for
state involvement in selection of remedial actions); 40 C.F.R. § 300.62 (1987) (stat-
ing authority and criteria for state and federal cooperation in cleanup of hazardous
waste sites); see also 42 U.S.C.§ 9605(a)(8)(B) (Supp. IV 1987) (each state shall submit
a priority list for site cleanup which the EPA shall consider in preparation of the
Federal Hazard Ranking System (NPL)).
25. The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency has entered into a cooperative
agreement with the EPA to establish a site assessment program for potential hazard-
ous waste sites. The site assessment program consists of the following four phases:
1. Site Discovery - The process of identifying previously unknown potential
hazardous waste sites. Sources for this information could include: citizen
complaints, tip hot lines, mandated federal/state/local government records,
etc.
2. Preliminary Assessment - Review of readily accessible information to char-
acterize the potential hazard and determine if the site warrants further ac-
tion. The information gathered at a preliminary assessment includes: site
history, known or alleged hazardous substances present and the potential
effect of the contamination on nearby population and resources.
3. Site Inspection - Includes collection and analysis of water, soil and air
samples, surveys, documentation of affected persons, property and re-
sources and review of owner and operator records.
4. Hazard Ranking Scoring - If the preliminary assessment indicates that
the site is a hazardous site, the site is ranked according to its relative severity
against other sites. The hazard score is used to establish a priority for deter-
mining if the site is eligible for federal or state superfund money.
Following the hazard ranking process, a site may be added to the NPL or Minnesota
[Vol. 14
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CERCLA,26 the United States Supreme Court has held that state en-
vironmental regulations may not preempt CERCLA.27
CERCLA also grants the EPA the authority to develop the Na-
tional Contingency Plan (NCP).28 The NCP is a comprehensive plan
which sets forth the standards and procedures for cleanup of hazard-
ous waste sites.29 These procedures are significant because the EPA
may only recover cleanup costs "not inconsistent" with the NCP.30
CERCLA Section 105 requires that the NCP contain the National
Priority List (NPL) of hazardous waste sites.31 Placement of a site on
the NPL is significant because Superfund money can only be spent
on a site which is listed on the NPL.32 The NCP must also include
the standards to determine the cleanup priority among the 703 haz-
ardous waste sites which are currently listed on the NPL.S3
list of priorities. A remedial investigation/feasibility study (RI/FS) is then conducted
to determine the extent of the contamination and to evaluate response action alterna-
tives. After the RI/FS is completed, appropriate response actions are taken at the
site. Minn. Pollution Control Agency Memo Re: MPCA's Site Assessment Program
For Potential Hazardous Waste Sites, Aug. 20, 1986.
26. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-16-101 to -201 (1982 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO
CODE §§ 39-4417 to -4417B (1985 & Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455B.381-
.399, 455B.423-.432 (West Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3430 to -3458 (1985);
MINN. STAT. §§ 115B.01-.35 (Supp. 1987).
27. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 367 (1986).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (Supp. IV 1987).
29. Id. Subpart F of the National Contingency Plan sets forth the regulations for
Hazardous Substance Response. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.61-.71 (1987).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1987).
31. Id. § 9605. The National Contingency Plan is set out at 40 C.F.R. § 300.1-.86
(1987). The National Priority List, which is part of the National Contingency Plan, is
set out in Appendix B of 40 C.F.R. § 300.1-.86 (1987).
32. 40 C.F.R.. § 300.68(a) (1987). Sites not listed on the NPL may be cleaned up
with private funds and the party incurring the costs may recover them directly from
the responsible party. See supra note 8; see also Pinole Point Properties v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 290 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (city brought suit against waste
generator for cleanup costs of site not listed on the NPL). It should be noted that a
site need not be listed on the NPL as a prerequisite to the EPA issuing an administra-
tive cleanup order. The EPA must establish only that the cleanup was necessary to
protect the public safety and welfare. Thus, the EPA may recover its costs if it subse-
quently cleans up the site because of a responsible party's non-compliance with the
order.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A) (Supp. IV 1987). The criteria for determining the
cleanup priority among hazardous waste sites is based upon the site's relative danger
to the public health or welfare or the environment in the judgment of the EPA. The
EPA must take into account to the extent possible the population at risk, the hazard
potential of the hazardous substances at such facilities, the potential for contamina-
tion of drinking water supplies, the potential for human contact, the potential for
destruction of sensitive ecosystems, the damage to natural resources which may affect
the human food chain, the contamination or potential contamination of the air, state
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CERCLA's term of art for the EPA's authority to clean up a site is
to take a "response action."34 "Response" means to initiate a reme-
dial35 or removal36 action when there is a release or threatened re-
lease of a hazardous substance or contaminant. 3 7 Remedial actions
are permanent cleanup measures taken by the EPA in response to a
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance.38 Removal
actions are temporary measures taken by the EPA to mitigate or pre-
vent environmental damage.39 To the extent practicable, removal
actions must be consistent with the EPA's permanent remedial action
plan.40
The EPA is required to request responsible parties to cleanup the
site before the EPA initiates a response action under section 104.41
If the responsible party refuses to cleanup the site, the EPA may then
spend Superfund money to do so and bring a cost recovery action
34. Id. § 9604(a). CERCLA § 104 sets forth the EPA's response authority when-
ever (1) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of release
into the environment, or (2) any pollutant or contaminant is a released or there is a
substantial threat of release into the environment which may present an imminent
and substantial danger to the public health or welfare. Id. The actual procedures the
EPA must follow in a response action are set forth at 40 C.F.R. § § 300.61-.71 (1987).
35. Remedial actions are actions taken consistent with the permanent remedy.
These actions are taken instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event of a
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment. In ad-
dition, they may be taken to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances
so that the hazardous substances do not migrate and cause substantial danger to the
public health, welfare or the environment. Included in the cost of remedial actions
are costs for permanent relocation of residents, businesses and community facilities
where the EPA determines that relocation is more cost-effective and environmentally
preferable to the transportation, storage, treatment, destruction or secure disposi-
tion of hazardous substances. Examples of remedial actions include storage, confine-
ment or perimeter protection using dikes, trenches or ditches, cleanup of released
substances, dredging or excavations, on-site treatment or incineration, collection of
leachate or runoff, repair and replacement of leaking containers and any monitoring
reasonably required to protect the public health and welfare and the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (Supp. IV 1987).
36. Removal actions are actions taken to clean up or remove released hazardous
substances or such actions as may be necessary in the event of the threat of release of
a hazardous substance. Removal actions include actions deemed necessary to moni-
tor, assess and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances,
along with such actions to prevent, mitigate or minimize damage to public health or
welfare or to the environment. Examples of removal actions include security fencing
or other measures to limit access, provision of alternative water supplies, and tempo-
rary evacuation and housing of threatened individuals not provided for under the
Disaster Relief Act of 1974. See id. § 9601(23).
37. See id. § 9601(25).
38. See supra note 35.
39. See supra note 36.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1987).
41. See id. § 9604(a)(1).
[Vol. 14
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under CERCLA Section 107 to replenish the Superfund.42 Alterna-
tively, CERCLA Section 106 authorizes the EPA to seek an injunc-
tion to compel a responsible party to cleanup a site that poses an
imminent and substantial danger to the public health or the environ-
ment.43 Section 106 further allows the EPA to issue administrative
orders as necessary to protect the public health and the
environment. 44
Whether the EPA chooses a Section 104 or a Section 106 action
may depend on several considerations. For example, Section 104 di-
rect cleanup actions may be administered quickly, but they deplete
the Superfund and require a significant amount of commitment by
EPA personnel.45 Section 106 abatement orders are less costly to
the Superfund, but may be hampered by demands for judicial review
by responsible parties.46 Controversy exists as to whether Section
104/107 or Section 106 should be the primary tool for enforcement
of CERCLA. 47 Inadequate statutory drafting and unfavorable court
rulings have been given as reasons for the EPA's primary reliance on
the more costly Section 104 action.48
A. Response Actions: CERCL4 Section 104
Response actions may be aimed at short-term removal of a hazard-
ous substance or threatened hazard, or they may be aimed at long-
term remedial solutions to the environmental problems caused by
the hazardous substance.49 The Federal Regulations set forth the
criteria for the EPA in determining whether a removal action, a re-
medial action or a combination of the two should be implemented to
cleanup the site.50 The degree of cleanup that the EPA must obtain
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1983 & Supp. IV 1987).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1983).
44. Id.
45. See Note, Developments in the Law - Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1458, 1486 (1986) (discussing factors which influence whether the EPA implements a




49. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1983 & Supp. IV 1987) (setting forth the EPA's
authority to respond to a hazardous substance or threatened hazard). Note that re-
moval actions should, to the extent that the EPA deems practicable, contribute to the
efficient performance of any long term remedial action taken with respect to the re-
lease or threatened release. Id.
50. 40 C.F.R. § 300.65(b)(2)(i)-(viii) (1987). The following factors must be con-
sidered by the EPA in determining the appropriateness of a removal action:
(i) Actual or potential exposure to hazardous substances or pollutants
or contaminants by nearby populations, animals, or food chain;
(ii) Actual or potential contamination of drinking water supplies or sen-
sitive ecosystems;
(iii) Hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants in drums, bar-
1988]
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when implementing a response action is set forth in CERCLA Sec-
tion 12151 and the NCP.52
rels, tanks, or others bulk storage containers, that may pose a threat of re-
lease;
(iv) High levels of hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants
in soils largely at or near the surface, that may migrate;
(v) Weather conditions that may cause hazardous substances or pollu-
tants or contaminants to migrate or be released;
(vi) Threat of fire or explosion;
(vii) The availability of other appropriate Federal or State response
mechanisms to respond to the release;
(viii) Other situations or factors which may pose threats to public
health or welfare or the environment.
Id.
The following factors must be considered by the EPA in determining the appro-
priateness of a remedial action:
(i) Population, environmental, and welfare concerns at risk;
(ii) Routes of exposure;
(iii) Amount, concentration, hazardous properties, environmental fate
and transport (e.g., ability and opportunity to bioaccumulate, persistence,
mobility, etc.), and form of the substance(s) present;
(iv) hydrogeological factors (e.g., soil permiability, depth to saturated
zone, hydrolic radients, proximity to a drinking water aquafer, floodplains
and wetlands proximity);
(v) Current and potential ground water use (e.g., the appropriate
ground water classes under the system established in the EPA Ground-
Water Protection Strategy);
(vi) Climate (rainfall, etc.);
(vii) The extent to which the source can be adequately identified and
characterized;
(viii) Whether substances at the site may be reused or recycled;
(ix) The likelihood of future releases if the substances remain on-site;
(x) The extent to which natural or man-made barriers currently contain
the substance and the adequacy of the barriers;
(xi) The extent to which the substances have migrated or are expected
to migrate from the area of their original location, or new location, if relo-
cated, and whether future migration may pose a threat to public health, wel-
fare or the environment;
(xii) The extent to which Federal environmental and public health re-
quirements are applicable or relevant and appropriate to the specific site,
and the extent to which other Federal criteria, advisories, and guidance and
State standards are to be considered in developing the remedy;
(xiii) The extent to which contamination levels exceed applicable or
relevant and appropriate Federal requirements or other Federal criteria, ad-
visories, and guidance and State standards;
(xiv) Contribution of the contamination to an air, land, water, and/or
food chain contamination problem;
(xv) Ability of responsible party to implement and maintain the remedy
until the threat is permanently abated;
(xvi) For Fund-financed responses, the availability of other appropriate
Federal or State response and enforcement mechanisms to respond to the
release; and
(xvii) Other appropriate matters may be considered.
40 C.F.R. § 300.68(e)(2)(i)-(xvi) (1987).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (Supp. IV 1987). See generally Volz & Stern, Mandatory
Cleanup Standards - A Pragmatic Approach, 13 CHEM. WASTE Lrr. RVrR. 538 (Mar.
1987) (discussing CERCLA cleanup standards and effect of 1986 amendments on
standards for future remedial actions).
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The EPA has broad authority to gather information on a hazard-
ous waste site in order to determine the appropriate response ac-
tion.53 For example, CERCLA Section 104 provides the EPA with
authority to enter a waste site for the purpose of inspecting and gath-
ering samples.54 The EPA may also require anyone who has infor-
mation about the hazardous substance to provide that information to
the EPA upon request. 55 The EPA is authorized to gather informa-
tion on the type of hazardous substance at the facility, the nature and
extent of the release of the substance and the ability of the poten-
tially responsible party to pay for the cleanup of the site.56 Addition-
ally, the EPA has the authority to inspect and copy all documents
relevant to these issues.57
The EPA may issue a compliance order if a person refuses to pro-
vide requested information.58 The EPA may also commence suit to
compel compliance with its order.50 The EPA need only show a rea-
sonable basis for its belief that a release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance has occurred, to obtain a court order to compel
compliance.6 0 Additionally, the court may assess up to a $25,000
penalty for each day of noncompliance.61
Upon completion of its investigation, the EPA is required to notify
all persons who it has identified as potentially responsible parties
(PRP) that they may be liable for the cleanup costs at the site.62 The
EPA will then prepare a response plan and issue a request for re-
sponse action to the PRP.63 Issuance of a request for response ac-
tion means that the EPA has determined that the party is no longer
potentially responsible, but is in fact responsible for the hazardous
52. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(i) (1987). For remedial actions, the degree of cleanup
must attain or exceed applicable or relevant and appropriate Federal public health
and environmental requirements that have been identified for the specific site. Id.
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e) (Supp. IV 1987).
54. Id. § 9604(e)(4)(A)-(B).
55. See id. § 9604(e)(2).
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. See id. § 9604(e)(5)(A).
59. See id. § 9604(e)(5)(B).
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 28, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6119, 6131.
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f) (Supp. IV 1987). In many cases, a state or local
agency will prepare the preliminary assessment and the response plan will subse-
quently direct the cleanup if the responsible party does not comply with the cleanup
request. In these cases, the state or local agency is referred to as the "lead agency."
In order to become a "lead agency" and obtain access to Superfund money, the
agency must be certified as competent by the EPA and enter into either a contract or
cooperative agreement with the EPA for those services. Id. § 9604 (c)-(d). See gener-
ally 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1987).
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condition.64 On the basis of this determination, with few exceptions,
the responsible party is effectively liable for all cleanup costs. This is
true whether the party chooses to cleanup the site as requested by
the response plan, or to disregard the request and be subject to suit
by the EPA for cleanup costs. 6 5
Courts agree that the EPA's designation of PRP status is not re-
viewable because it is not a final agency action.66 This conclusion is
based on the fact that, at this juncture, the EPA has not developed or
initiated a response plan and may ultimately decide not to respond
to the release.67 Nevertheless, courts also hold that there can be no
review of an EPA response plan because pre-enforcement review
would frustrate the purpose of CERCLA by encouraging litigation.68
Although courts have recognized that this lack of review raises due
process concerns, they have held that the responsible parties are ad-
equately protected by their opportunity under CERCLA Section 107
to raise their claim of inconsistent response actions as a defense in
the EPA's subsequent cost recovery action.69
64. See id. § 9607(a). EPA identification as a responsible party means that the
EPA has identified the person or entity as one who is strictly liable for cleanup costs
by being a past transporter, generator, waste site operator or waste handler. Id.
65. See id. § 9607; see also supra note 5 (defenses to the imposition of strict
liability).
66. See, e.g., D'Imperio v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 248, 251 (D.N.J. 1983).
67. See Notice of EPA Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034,
5040 (1985). See also Pacific Resins & Chem., Inc., 579 F. Supp. at 4-5; D'Imperio, 575 F.
Supp. at 252.
68. See, e.g., Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. United States Envtl. Protection
Agency, 777 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986) (no due pro-
cess violation in barring pre-enforcement review of emergency or remedial action on
top priority hazardous waste site);J. V. Peters & Co. v. Administrator, 767 F.2d 263,
265 (6th Cir. 1985) (no pre-enforcement review of CERCLA Section 104/107 as it
would hinder objective of CERCLA, prompt cleanup); United States v. Reilly Tar &
Chem. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 412, 422 (D. Minn. 1985) (no violation of due process
when civil penalties are assessed for noncompliance without provisions for review).
See also S. REP. No. II, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1985). This report states ("[Pire-
enforcement review would be a significant obstacle to the implementation of re-
sponse actions ... Pre-enforcement review would lead to considerable delay in pro-
viding cleanups, would increase response costs, and would discourage settlements
and voluntary cleanups"). But see Aminoil, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection
Agency, 599 F. Supp. 69, 75 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (government enjoined from assessing
penalties for noncompliance upon showing of pollutor's probable success on the
merits).
69. See, e.g., Lone Pine Steering Comm., 777 F.2d at 887; United States v. United
Nuclear Corp., 610 F. Supp. 527, 529 (D.N.M. 1985) (defendant can raise objections
to EPA response activity in cost recovery suit along with damages caused to defend-
ant by the procedural irregularity). One commentator points out that a PRP is af-
forded practical protection from unjust claims "by the fact that the EPA has no
incentive to undertake unjustified cleanup measures. The reason is that the EPA may
only recover from responsible parties those costs 'not-inconsistent' with the NCP."
Note, supra note 45, at 1489.
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It is prudent for a PRP with CGL coverage to notify his carrier
upon receipt of a PRP notice even though many CGL carriers will
subsequently deny coverage on the theory that their duty to defend
does not arise unless an actual lawsuit is filed.70 Furthermore, if the
EPA directs the PRP to abate a threatened release, many carriers
deny coverage because an occurrence causing property damage has
not yet triggered coverage. In declaratory proceedings, the outcome
of these theories are mixed. One court has unequivocally held that
potential liability under CERCLA establishes the CGL carrier's duty
to defend and indemnify its insured unless there is another provision
in the policy which clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage.71
The majority of courts hold, however, that a CGL carrier has no duty
to defend its insured prior to the EPA cost recovery suit, if at all.72
This means that actual property damage must occur before coverage
is triggered. Consequently, most response actions are taken by the
EPA before CGL coverage issues between the responsible party and
the CGL carrier have been resolved.
B. Administrative Enforcement: CERCLA Section 106
Under CERCLA Section 106(a), the EPA may ask the Attorney
General to seek injunctive relief in federal court against a responsi-
ble party when the EPA determines that a hazardous waste site poses
an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or the envi-
ronment. 73 Alternatively, CERCLA Section 106(a) authorizes the
EPA to issue an administrative order to compel a responsible party
to take remedial action when such action is necessary to protect the
public health and welfare or the environment. 74 Injunctive relief
may be difficult to obtain because courts have held that CERCLA
Section 106(a) is only a jurisdictional statement. 75 Because of this
judicial interpretation of Section 106, the EPA must establish that
the site poses an imminent and substantial danger before a federal
70. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 75
(E.D. Mich. 1987) (CGL carrier asserts that it has no duty to defend until actual law-
suit is filed); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 647 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (D. Idaho 1986) (duty
to defend arises upon the filing of a complaint when allegations reveal a potential for
liability).
71. See Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents and Chems. Co., 17 Ohio
App. 3d 127, 130, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1232 (1984).
72. See, e.g., Bunker Hill Co., 647 F. Supp. at 1068 (duty to defend arises upon
filing of a complaint when allegations reveal a potential for liability). But see Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1354 (4th Cir. 1987) (CGL carrier has no
duty to defend EPA cost recovery suit because there is no suit against the insured
seeking "damages" within the meaning of a CGL policy).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1983).
74. Id. § 9606(a) (Supp. III 1987).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D.
Mo. 1985) (CERCLA Section 106 is a jurisdictional statement).
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court will grant the injunction.76 One Note suggests that this inter-
pretation is supported by the fact that CERCLA Sections 104 and
107 provide the government with the means to promptly respond to
a hazardous condition that poses an immediate threat to public
health and environment.
7 7
The EPA will often issue administrative cleanup orders as a result
of thejudiciary's interpretation of the EPA's authority to seek injunc-
tive relief.78 The EPA has two alternatives when a responsible party
does not comply with its administrative order. First, the EPA may
attempt to enforce the order in federal court under CERC[A Section
106(b).79 If the EPA obtains the enforcement order, the responsible
party may be fined up to $25,000 per day for noncompliance with the
original administrative order.80 One Note points out that "[n]othing
prevents the EPA from waiting an extended period of time to bring
its enforcement action and thereby increasing the pressure on poten-
tially responsible parties to comply without judicial review." 8 ' Sec-
ond, if the EPA can prove that the responsible party lacked sufficient
cause for noncompliance, it may clean up the site and then sue the
responsible party for treble damages under CERCLA Section
107(c)(3).82 The sufficient cause defense has been narrowly con-
strued and only rarely has a responsible party prevailed.83 As one
Note points out, Congress intended the punitive nature of CER-
CLA's administrative enforcement provisions to have an "in terrorem"
effect on a PRP.84
II. THE CGL CARRIER'S DUTY TO DEFEND A SUIT FOR "DAMAGES"
CERCLA grants the EPA broad authority to respond to a hazard-
ous waste condition. Consequently, an insured under a CGL policy
who is identified as a responsible party faces extensive liability for
cleanup costs and possible civil penalties, but is provided with few
procedural protections. 85 The procedural protections that are avail-
able are simply threshold requirements. In a response action under
CERCLA Section 104, the EPA need only establish that the site is
76. See id.
77. See Note, supra note 45, at 1494; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607 (1983 &
Supp. IV 1987).
78. See Note, supra note 45, at 1493-94 (discussing factors which influence the
EPA in issuing an administrative cleanup order rather than seeking injunctive relief).
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1987).
80. See id.




85. See supra text accompanying notes 3-10.
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listed on the NPL.86 For the issuance of an administrative cleanup
order under CERCLA Section 106, the EPA need only demonstrate
that the release or threatened release poses an imminent and sub-
stantial danger to the public health or welfare or the environment.8
7
The EPA may initiate either action only after it meets these threshold
requirements as set out in CERCLA.88
Failure to meet these threshold requirements does not leave the
EPA without a remedy to respond to a release of a hazardous sub-
stance. CERCLA Section 107 provides that the EPA can sue for
damages for loss of value to the environment caused by the release
of a hazardous substance.89 This provision is seldom used, however,
since the main objective of the EPA is to cleanup waste sites accord-
ing to the NCP.90 As a result, the EPA has seldom sought compensa-
tory relief against responsible parties. Instead, the EPA has
consistently excercised its cleanup authority under CERCLA Sec-
tions 104/107 and 106.91
When a responsible party tenders the defense of the suit to its
CGL carrier, the CGL carrier has three options. First, the carrier
may agree to defend and indemnify its insured. Second, the carrier
may agree to defend its insured under a reservation of rights. Third,
the carrier may deny coverage based on a variety of theories.92 Sec-
tion II of this Note will explore one such theory: that EPA response
costs are not damages within the meaning of a CGL policy because a
threatened release is not tangible injury to property, and in any
event, cleanup costs are restitution rather than compensatory dam-
ages and thus are not covered under a CGL policy.
A. The Typical CGL Policy
A typical CGL policy provides insurance coverage for:
all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this
(insurance) applies, caused by an occurrence, and the company
shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured
seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or property
damage .... 93
Occurrence is defined under a typical CGL policy as "an accident,"
86. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1983 & Supp. IV 1987).
87. Id. § 9606(a) (1983).
88. See id. §§ 9604, 9606 (1983 & Supp. IV 1987).
89. See id. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (Supp. IV 1987).
90. Id.
91. See Note, supra note 45, at 1486 (discussing factors which influence whether
EPA implements a Section 104/107 or Section 106 response action and why the EPA
does not sue for loss in value to natural resources under its CERCLA authority).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 18-23.
93. See Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1327 (4th Cir. 1986).
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including injurious exposure to conditions, which results in bodily
injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured. So long as the resulting damage is unex-
pected and unintended it will be deemed to be caused by an accident
or be an occurrence. 94
Under the CGL policy, the carrier's duty to defend and indemnify
the insured arises when an injury occurs to a person or property
owner by someone other than the insured during the policy period.95
As long as the injury occurs during the policy period, neither the
event causing the injury nor the actual filing of a claim need occur
during the policy period.96 Establishing the exact moment of injury
is difficult when pollution has leaked over an extended period of
time.97 Various theories for triggering coverage have emerged, how-
ever, a complete analysis of these theories is beyond the scope of this
Note.9 8 It should be noted that the case law and literature in support
of one trigger theory over another is quite extensive, and varies con-
siderably between jurisdictions.99
B. The CGL Pollution Exclusion Clause
In 1970, insurance companies attempted to exclude CGL coverage
for environmental damage caused by the release of pollutants or haz-
ardous substances, except for "sudden and accidental" pollution.OO
CGL coverage was intended to apply only to liability for accidents
94. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
95. See Adler & Broiles, The Pollution Exclusion: Implementing the Social Policy of
Preventing Pollution Through the Insurance Policy, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV., 1251, 1253 (1986).
See generally Willmarth, Outline of Insurance Developments, 21 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 23,
23-26 (Summer 1971) (discussing coverage provided by CGL policy).
96. See Adler & Broiles, supra note 95, at 1253.
97. See id. at 1253-54.
98. Id.
99. See generally Hourihan, supra note 17, at 551-52, 559 (setting out scenario for
typical pollution claim where leakage occurs over a long period of time, but pointing
out that insured only has burden to prove that damage occurred, while the insurance
carrier must bring forth evidence that damage did not occur within the policy
period).
100. See generally McGeough, The Applicability of Liability Insurance Coverage to Actions
Involving Environmental Damage, 1971 A.B.A. SEC. INS., NEGL. AND COMPENSATION LAW
312 (historical overview of pollution exclusion clause). The typical pollution exclu-
sion in a CGL policy excluded coverage for:
bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, re-
lease or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals,
liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or other
pollutants into or upon the atmosphere or any water course or body of
water, but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release
or escape is sudden and accidental ....
See Willmarth, supra note 95, at 25-26 (quoting exclusion endorsement clause used by
insurance rating board) (emphasis added).
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when the effects of the pollution contamination were known reason-
ably soon after the occurence.t 0 t Problems arose, however, when
the effects of the pollution were not known until years after the in-
jury, or where there was continuous or gradual leakage over a long
period of time.' 02 In these cases, many courts found that the exclu-
sion was ambiguous and held that it does not preclude coverage for
pollution damages.103 Specifically, courts interpreted the terms
"sudden and accidental" in the exclusion as simply a restatement of
the definition of occurrence - the policy will cover claims where the
injury was neither expected nor intended by the insured.t 04 The ef-
fect is that courts construed the pollution exclusion to be an affirma-
tion of the principle of what constitutes an occurrence. Coverage
will not be provided for intended results of an intentional act but will
be provided for the unintended results of an intentional act.' 05
Some courts have not found this ambiguity in the pollution exclu-
sion clause.t06 In these jurisdictions, the pollution exclusion pro-
vides the CGL carrier with a defense to providing coverage when its
insured is faced with PRP status or an EPA cost recovery action.IO1 It
is interesting to note, however, that the standard CGL policy has
been recently revised in an attempt to exclude coverage for all pollu-
tion damage claims.108
C. Duty to Defend a Suit for "Damages"
As stated above, under the typical CGL policy, the CGL carrier
contracts to provide insurance coverage for all sums which the in-
sured shall become legally obligated to pay as "damages" because of
101. See Adler & Broiles, supra note 95, at 1254.
102. See id. at 1253-54. See generally McGeough, supra note 100.
103. See Adler & Broiles, supra note 95, at 1261-63.
104. See id. at 1253.
105. See id. at 1268. A good survey of decisions finding the pollution exclusion to
be ambiguous is found in Jackson Township Municipal Utilities Auth. v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156, 161-64, 451 A.2d 990, 992-94
(1982). Many of these cases, including Jackson Township, find the "sudden and acci-
dental" exception clause itself to be ambiguous. Id. at 165-66, 451 A.2d at 994-95.
See also CPS Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 558, 569, 489 A.2d
1265, 1270-71 (1984) ("It may well be that the drafters of this [pollution exclusion]
clause believed that 'sudden and accidental' connoted a sense of a dramatic catastro-
phe, limited in duration and immediate in its consequences, but it cannot fairly be
said that this was unambiguously expressed").
106. See, e.g., Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727
F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1984) (exclusion upheld as to pollution injuries caused by in-
sured's barrel reconditioning operation); American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casu-
alty Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549, 1552 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (exclusion upheld where insured
produced and disposed of toxic waste as a "natural and usual part of its business").
107. See supra note 106 and cases cited therein.
108. This revision was drafted in 1987 in an effort to prevent the ambiguous lan-
guage of the standard pollution exclusion clause used by the insurance industry.
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bodily injury or property damage. 109 Many CGL carriers will deny
coverage for an EPA cleanup cost recovery suit because cleanup
costs are simply restitution to return the environment to its status
quo rather than compensatory "damages" for actual loss of value to
the environment. I 10 The defense therefore concerns the form of re-
lief sought for environmental property damage and hinges on defini-
tions of "property damage" and "damages." 1
The definition damage is set forth in Black's Law Dictionary as
follows:
Damage. Loss, injury or deterioration, caused by the negligence,
design, or accident of one person to another, in respect of the lat-
ter's person or property. The word is to be distinguished from its
plural, "damages" which means a compensation in money for a
loss or damage. " 2
The definition of "damages" in Blacks Law Dictionary supports the
insurer's proposition that a CGL policy only provides coverage for
compensation for loss, rather than restitution." 13 This definition is
relevant in this situation, the carriers argue, because of the well es-
tablished principle that insurance policy language must be given the
meaning that it would convey to an ordinary insured.14 Of course,
whether an ordinary insured would understand the technical mean-
ing of damages is debatable in states that apply the objective expec-
tation doctrine in insurance contract disputes. Since federal courts
must apply state law in interpreting the contract, there is no nation-
wide consensus as to whether CERCLA response costs are
109. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
110. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988). The Armco court states:
In defining "damages," and distinguishing "damages" from equitable reme-
dies, we focus not on the nature of the underlying action, but rather on the
form of relief sought. In other words, whether a particular cause of action
has historically been considered a "legal" or "equitable" proceeding, with
the differing procedural and substantive rights thereto appertaining, is irrel-
evant. The insurance contract, which controls the obligations between the
parties and therefore centers the focus of this court, is written in terms of
the relief sought, and not in terms of the form of the cause of action. The
contract describes "damages" to be paid, and not liabilities arising out of
"legal," rather than "equitable" proceedings.
Id. at 1352 (emphasis in original).
111. See id.; see also Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem.
Co., 811 F.2d 1180, 1189 n.21 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 842 F.2d 977
(8th Cir. 1988).
112. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 351 (5th ed. 1979).
113. See Continental Ins. Cos., 811 F.2d at 1189 n.21.
114. See id. But see Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New
York, 218 N.J. Super. 516, 522-25, 528 A.2d 76, 80 (App. Div. 1987) (insured would
expect coverage for all damages flowing from environmental property damage).
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damages. 1 5
Insurance carriers also provide policy reasons for denying cover-
age for CERCLA cleanup costs."16 One reason is that the costs in-
curred in complying with an EPA injunction under CERCLA Section
106 are not the result of a tangible injury to property." 17 Instead,
these costs represent an amount spent to prevent a future tangible
injury or to mitigate the effects of a hazardous waste condition.'18
Therefore, there is no bodily injury or property damage. Further-
more, injury prevention and mitigation are not insurable risks under
a CGL policy because the carrier would be unable to insure these
types of risks with any certainty.' '9 A judicial finding of coverage for
injury prevention would thus result in the insurer providing cover-
age for measures outside of the insurance contract.120
The final argument offered by insurance carriers in opposition to
coverage for CERCLA cleanup costs involves the EPA's choice of
remedy to respond to a hazardous waste condition.121 Under CER-
CLA Section 107, responsible parties are liable for: 1) all costs of
removal or remedial actions incurred by the United States govern-
ment which are not inconsistent with the NCP; 2) any other neces-
sary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with
the NCP; 3) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources; and 4) the costs of any health assessment or health effects
study carried out under CERCLA Section 104(i).122 The carrier's ar-
gument is that the EPA has not exercised its remedy to sue for dam-
ages for loss in value of natural resources as provided by CERCLA
Section 107.123 Instead, the EPA has chosen to clean up the site and
sue the responsible party for any costs incurred in the cleanup pro-
cess. 124 The cost of cleanup cannot be interpreted to be a claim for
damages under CERCLA because the remedies listed in CERCLA
Section 107 make the distinction between restitution costs and com-
115. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (federal courts to
apply state law in diversity cases).
116. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co., 822 F.2d at 1353-54.
117. See id.; see also supra note 21.
118. See Maryland Casualty Co., 822 F.2d at 1353-54; see also supra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text (discussion on the types of activities which the EPA may imple-
ment as remedial or removal actions pursuant to its authority under CERCLA).
119. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co., 822 F.2d at 1353; see also Amicus Curiae Brief
for American Insurance Association in Support of Petition for Rehearing and Sug-
gestion for Rehearing En Banc at 16, Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharma-
ceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 811 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1987).
120. See Maryland Casualty Co., 822 F.2d at 1353.
121. See id.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A-D) (Supp. III 1987).
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pensatory damages.125
D. The Liberal and Strict Interpretation of "Damages" Under A CGL
Policy
Courts are split as to the merits of the insurer's theory that the
costs of EPA response actions are not "damages." Some courts find
coverage for an insured because the insured could reasonably expect
CGL coverage when faced with a CERCLA cost recovery suit or an
administrative cleanup order.12 6 Other courts have held that the in-
sured could not expect coverage for CERCLA suits because the term
"damages" is not ambiguous in the insurance context.' 27 These
courts give damages its technical meaning: compensation for loss in
value.' 28 These courts deny coverage since cost recovery suits seek
restitution and CGL policies only provide coverage for compensa-
tory damages for loss in value to property. 29
1. The Liberal View
In Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp.,13o the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan adopted the
Michigan Court of Appeals' reasoning in United States Aviex Co. v.
Travelers Insurance Co.131 The Ex-Cell-O court held that damages in-
clude money spent to clean up environmental contamination.t32
The Ex-Cello-O court also held that coverage does not hinge on the
nature of relief sought but on an actual or threatened use of the legal
process to coerce payment or conduct by a policyholder.133 Follow-
ing this rationale, responsible party status, or even PRP status, would
trigger the insurer's duty to defend its insured because CERCLA au-
thorizes the EPA to either "coerce payment" through a cost recovery
suit or "coerce conduct" through the issuance of an administrative
order.
In Aviex, a polluter sought a declaratory judgment that its CGL
carrier provide indemnification for the costs of compliance with a
Michigan Department of Natural Resources order to clean up con-
125. See id.
126. See, e.g., Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York,
218 N.J. Super. 516, 536, 528 A.2d 76, 86 (1987).
127. See Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842
F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir. 1988).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co., 822 F.2d at 1352-53 (CERCLA cost recovery
suits seek restitution relief and not compensatory damages).
130. 662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
131. 125 Mich. App. 579, 336 N.W.2d 838 (1983).
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taminated underground water.' 3 4 The trial court held in favor of the
polluter, holding that the insurer was obligated to defend and in-
demnify any claim or action against its insured. The court ordered
the insurer to pay for the costs of cleaning up the contaminated
water underneath the insured's premises and the water which had
migrated beyond the insured's premises.135 The decision was ap-
pealed by the insurer on a variety of grounds. One ground for ap-
peal which the insurer asserted was that the trial court's ruling
incorrectly construed the CGL policy to cover compliance costs of
injunctive orders, instead of covering only money paid or ordered to
be paid as compensation for injury or loss.' 3 6 The polluter argued
that damages should be interpreted as all sums which the insured is
obligated to pay by reason of liability imposed by law stemming from
property damage to a third party.' 37
The Michigan Court of Appeals recognized that the insurer's obli-
gation to pay would depend on its interpretation of damages.
38 It
noted that other jurisdictions have held that the cost of complying
with an EPA directive is not covered by a CGL policy because such
relief is injunctive, rather than compensation for damages.' 3 9 Never-
theless, the Aviex court ruled that such construction of damages
would be too narrow under Michigan law.140 In support of its opin-
ion, the court cited a Michigan statute that empowered the attorney
general to file a suit to recover the full value of the injuries done to
the natural resources of the state.14' The court then held that dam-
age to natural resources is measured by the cost to restore the water
to its original condition rather than the loss in property value.142
The Aviex court recognized that damages under a CGL policy tra-
ditionally mean compensatory loss and not restitution.143 This dis-
134. See United States Aviex Co., 125 Mich. App. at 582-83, 336 N.W.2d at 840.
135. Id. at 584-85, 336 N.W. at 841.
136. United States Aviex Co., 125 Mich. App. at 587-88, 336 N.W.2d at 842. The
insurer also appealed the trial court's order for summary judgment that the policy
covered damage to percolating water directly beneath the insured's property. The
insurer argued that the damage was excluded from coverage because it was property
owned by the insured. Id. at 590, 336 N.W.2d at 843. The Michigan Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the trial court and held that the percolating water under a landowner's
property is not the property of the landowner. Thus, damage to the water directly
beneath the insured's property was covered under the CGL policy. Id. at 590-92, 336
N.W.2d at 843-44.
137. See id. at 588, 336 N.W.2d at 842.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 588-89, 336 N.W.2d at 842-43.
140. Id. at 589-90, 336 N.W.2d at 843.
141. Id.
142. Id. The Aviex court found that "[t]he damage to natural resources is simply
measured in the cost to restore the water to its original state." Id.
143. Id. at 842-43.
19881
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tinction is important because it may very well cost more to clean up a
site than to compensate the damaged party for loss in value to the
property. 144 Ironically, the Aviex court used a statute empowering
the state to recover the full value of injuries to natural resources in
support of its finding that damages under Michigan law should be
construed to include restitution damages.145
The Aviex court also found that it was "merely fortuitous" that the
state issued a cleanup injunction rather than clean up the site itself
and sue the polluter for its cleanup costs. 14 6 This is a common state
court position because under most state laws, the environmental
agency could have cleaned the site itself and sued for cleanup dam-
ages, rather than sue for injunctive relief.147 The Aviex court thus
ignored the artificial distinction between the equity of restitution and
compensatory money damages because it recognized that the mea-
sure of damages would be the same under either remedy.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michi-
gan in Ex-Cell-O adopted the Aviex court's "merely fortuitous" rea-
soning that both the cost of complying with an injunction and a cost
recovery suit constitute damages under a CGL policy.1 48 Unlike
Aviex, Ex-Cell-O involved CERCLA.149 The policyholders in Ex-Cell-O
sought partial summary judgment for an order directing their CGL
carriers to defend and indemnify against potential liability under
CERCLA.150 At the time the motion was brought, the policyholders
had received only a PRP letter from the EPA.t5' The insurers re-
fused to defend on the ground that the PRP letter did not constitute
a suit and that CERCLA response actions were not "damages."15 2
Relying on Aviex, the Ex-Cell-O court held that "suit" includes any
effort to impose on a policyholder a liability ultimately enforceable
by a court, and that "damages" include money spent to clean up en-
vironmental contamination and restore the site to its previous
144. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1353 (4th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988).
145. See United States Aviex Co., 125 Mich. App. at 589-90, 336 N.W.2d at 843
("under M.C.L. § 323.10; M.S.A. § 3.529(1), the Attorney General is empowered to
file a suit to recover the full value of the injuries done to the natural resources of the
state").
146. Id. at 590, 336 N.W.2d at 843 (The Aviex court assumed that the CGL policy
would provide coverage for cleanup costs incurred by the state).
147. See, e.g., Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection, 138 N.J.
Super. 275, 350 A.2d 520 (1975), aff'd, 145 N.J. Super. 433, 368 A.2d 363 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977).
148. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
149. Id. at 73.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 74.
152. Id. at 75.
[Vol. 14
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condition. '53
Other courts have also interpreted their state law to mandate lib-
eral construction of damages because of the ultimate liability that
will fall on the responsible party. In Broadwell Realty Services, Inc. v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 154 the Superior Court of New
Jersey applied the doctrine of "reasonable expectations of the in-
sured" in interpreting the meaning of damages in a CGL policy.'55
In Broadwell, the insured brought suit against its CGL carrier for
monetary damages for breach of its insurance agreement.' 56 The
CGL carrier had denied indemnification to its insured for amounts
the insured spent at the direction of the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) to mitigate the effects of a gasoline
Spill.157
The Broadwell court held that the CGL policy provided coverage
for the mitigation measures because such measures fell within the
category of coverage for which liability insurance ordinarily ap-
plied.58 This is true, the court reasoned, even if mitigation meas-
ures are non-compensatory because such measures are designed to
prevent the continued destruction of property owned by third par-
ties.15 9 The Broadwell court was satisfied that the insurer would have
been obligated to indemnify its insured for the costs incurred in or-
der to protect a third party's property. 60 As the court stated, "the
policy does not require the parties to calmly await further
catastrophe." 161
The Broadwell court conceded that "damages" under a CGL policy
typically mean pecuniary compensation and that the cost of comply-
ing with an injunction does not ordinarily fall within that defini-
tion. 1 6 2 Despite that concession, the court concluded that the state
environmental agency's directive and threats of triple penalties con-
stituted a claim for damages.' 63 The court reasoned that the in-
sured's compliance costs were incurred to discharge a legal
obligation to the agency or to prevent what would have been an una-
voidable legal obligation to a third party. ' 6 4 The court also took no-
tice of the coercive effect that the state directive and penalties had on
153. Id.
154. 218 NJ. Super. 516, 528 A.2d 76 (App. Div. 1987).
155. See id. at 525-28, 528 A.2d at 80-82.
156. Id. at 522, 528 A.2d at 79.
157. Id. at 521-22, 528 A.2d at 79.
158. Id. at 525, 528 A.2d at 81.
159. Id. at 526, 528 A.2d at 81.
160. Id.
161. Id.





Buse: CERCLA Cost Recovery Suits: A Suit against an Insured for Damages
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
the insured. 165 Under these circumstances, the court concluded that
the insured would have a reasonable expectation of indemnification
for the mitigation costs under NewJersey law.166
The New Jersey environmental statute gives the state environmen-
tal agency authority similar to that given the EPA under CERCLA.
Similar to the New Jersey statute, CERCLA imposes strict liability for
cleanup costs on a responsible party but provides the responsible
party few procedural protections.167 CERCLA, as the New Jersey
statute in Broadwell, provides for civil penalties for noncompliance
with an EPA cleanup request. CERCLA response actions or cleanup
orders thus cause a coercive effect on a responsible party similar to
the New Jersey directive in Broadwell.168 Therefore, despite the fact
that Broadwell is not a CERCLA case, the ramifications of the objec-
tive expectation of the insured doctrine in insurance coverage dis-
putes involving environmental cleanups are enormous since federal
courts must apply state law in interpreting insurance contracts. 169
This results in inconsistent interpretation of the term damages
throughout the nation.170
2. The Strict View
Not all courts hold that the coercive effect of environmental claims
trigger the objective expectations of the insured doctrine.171 In Con-
tinental Insurance Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceuticals & Chemical Co. 17 2
("NEPACCO"), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
District Court for the Western District of Missouri's order granting
summary judgment for the insurer that damages under a CGL policy
165. See id.
166. Id. at 528, 528 A.2d at 82.
167. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
168. See supra text accompanying note 84.
169. Erie Railroad Co., 304 U.S. at 78.
170. Federal circuit courts of appeal addressing the question of whether CERCLA
response cost constitute "damages" have answered the issue negatively. See NEP-
PACO, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988); Maryland Casualty Ins. Co. v. Armco, 822 F.2d
1348 (4th Cir. 1988). While no federal circuit court has ruled to the contrary, a
number of federal district courts and state courts have held such costs do constitute
damages. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 673 F.
Supp. 1359 (D. Del. 1987); Ex-Cell-O, 662 F. Supp. 71;Aviex, 125 Mich. App. 579, 336
N.W. 2d 838 (1983); Broadwell, 528 A.2d 76 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Compass
Ins. Co. v. Cravens, Dargan & Co., 748 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1988). See also 13 POLL.
LrTG. RvrR. 208-09 (Aug. 1988) (listing federal and state court decisions finding
response costs are damages under a CGL policy).
171. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Cos., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988) ("damages" should
be given its technical meaning); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348
(4th Cir. 1987) ("damages" should be given its legal, technical meaning as described
in Hanna).
172. 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988).
[Vol. 14
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do not include cleanup costs. 173 The NEPACCO court held that
"damages" was not ambiguous in the insurance context and that the
plain meaning of the term damages as used in the insurance context
refers to legal damages and does not include equitable relief.174 The
NEPACCO court pointed out that if damages were given a liberal in-
terpretation to include any obligation to pay, then the term "dam-
ages" in the insurance contract would be surplusage because any
obligation, whether compensatory or restitution, would be cov-
ered.t75 The majority concluded that even though the term damages
is not defined in the CGL policy, it is not ambiguous and should,
therefore, be accorded its technical meaning ordinarily given in in-
surance contracts. 176
The NEPACCO minority was critical of what it perceived as the ma-
jority's disregard of Missouri law in interpreting the term dam-
ages.' 77 The minority believed that the term damages should convey
the meaning that an ordinary insured would understand, i.e., cover-
age for damage to property. 78 The NEPACCO minority argued that
there is no distinction under Missouri law between legal damages
and equitable or restitution damages unless the cost of restoring the
damaged property exceeds the value of the property interest dam-
aged.t7 9 The NEPACCO minority thus took the position of the in-
sured that the policy covers any damages sought for injury to
property owned by a third party, and that the technical meaning of
damages should not control.180
The objective expectation of the insured is not the only basis on
which coverage has been determined in favor of the insured, as in
Broadwell, or against the insured, as in NEPACCO. The coverage is-
sue has also been framed as a choice of remedies issue to which the
insured's expectation is of no consequence. The argument is that
Section 107(a)(4)(C) authorizes the EPA to sue a responsible party
for loss in value to the environment. As a result of the EPA's deci-
sion to exercise its response authority under Sections 104 and 106, it
has chosen the restitutional remedy over the compensatory remedy.
This decision has been held to preclude an insured from coverage
since a CGL policy only provides coverage for compensatory
damages.18 1
173. Id. at 987.
174. Id. at 985.
175. See id. at 986.
176. See id. at 985-87.
177. See id. at 988-90.
178. Id. at 989.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 989-90.
181. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1354 (4th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988) (response costs are not damages within the
1988]
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The EPA's choice of remedy argument has been characterized by
the Aviex court as "merely fortuitous" since the measure of compen-
satory damages, or loss in value to the environment, is measured by
the cost to cleanup the environment.182 Consequently, the measure
of damages under either of CERCLA's remedies would be the same.
The federal circuit courts of appeal addressing this issue have re-
jected the liberal Aviex court's "merely fortuitous" reasoning. In re-
jecting this view, the fourth circuit, in Maryland Casualty Insurance Co.
v. Armco, 18 3 and the eighth circuit in NEPACCO, concluded that the
"merely fortuitous" rationale ignored the fact that the coverage issue
was really a matter of interpretation of the insurance contract rather
than the EPA's "fortuitous" choice of remedies under CERCLA.184
The Armco court hesitated to stretch the black letter meaning of dam-
ages to include equitable forms of relief such as restitution because
such interpretation would change the obligation of the parties to the
insurance contract.' 8 5 To rule otherwise would effectively "extend
meaning of a CGL policy); C. D. Sprangler Const. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft and
Engineering Co., No. 86-CVS-13349 (Sup. Ct. Div., N.C.,Jan. 4, 1988) (order grant-
ing declaratory judgment in favor of CGL carrier that carrier has no duty to defend
or indemnify insured for CERCLA response costs); Protective National Ins. Co. v.
Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, No. C-514-463 (Sup. Ct. Cal. L.A., Oct. 29, 1987) (summary
judgment for insurance carrier's proposition that only CERCLA Section 107(a)(4)(c)
provides for "damages" within the meaning of a CGL policy and that all other reme-
dies under CERCLA are restitution); International Mineral & Chem. Co. v. Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co., No. 84-L-50979 (Cir. Cook Ill., Jan. 6, 1987), aff'd 168 Ill. App.3d
361, 522 N.E.2d 758 (1988) (order granting summary judgment for insurer that re-
sponse costs do not constitute damages under a CGL policy).
182. Aviex, 125 Mich. App. at 590, 336 N.W. 2d at 843. Note that Aviex concerns a
state environmental regulation rather than CERCLA. For purposes of analogy, how-
ever, this factor is not important since many state cleanup regulations model
CERCLA.
183. 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988).
184. Id. The Armco court found the Aviex court's reasoning faulty for two reasons:
First, it is not necessarily correct that the measure of relief is unrelated to
whether the government sues for reimbursement or for damages. Damages
is a form of substitutional redress which seeks to replace the loss in value
with a sum of money. Restitution, conversely, is designed to reimburse a
party for restoring the status quo. It might very well cost far more to restore
a contaminated [environment] than it would to pay damages for its loss ....
Second, even assuming that the costs to the defendant are the same regard-
less of whether the government sues for restitution or for damages, thus in
some sense rendering the decision by the government regarding whether to
sue for damages or restitution a "mere fortuity," it is a great step, and a
dangerous one, for courts to begin to construe insurance policies to encom-
pass costs of compliance with injunctive and reimbursement relief.
Id.
See also Continental Ins. Cos., 811 F.2d at 1189 n.21 (technical meaning of damages
should control rather than the insured's objective meaning). Note that the Armco
CGL policy was a negotiated manuscript policy rather than a standard form CGL
policy.
185. Armco, 822 F.2d at 1353.
[Vol. 14
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the obligations of insurance carriers beyond the well-illumed area of
tangible injury and into the murky and boundless realm of injury
prevention." 18
6
In coming to this conclusion, the Armco court reasoned that EPA
response costs are fundamentally geared to prevent injury because
they are taken to avoid future tangible injury to humans and the en-
vironment or to mitigate environmental damage that has already oc-
curred.18 7 As discussed in the first section of this Note, the EPA only
has authority to take response actions when there has been a release
or threat of release of a hazardous substance.18 8 Response costs flow-
ing from the response actions are defined under CERCLA as costs to
remedy or mitigate a hazardous substance or condition or threatened
release.' 89 By its very definition, CERCLA response actions can be
implemented before any property damage occurs. 190 Thus, CER-
CLA costs may be incurred to prevent property damage, rather than
to compensate the public for loss of value to the environment.
This distinction between the restitutional nature of response ac-
tions and recovery for loss in value under CERCLA Section
107(a)(4)(c) is paramount under the strict view expressed by the
Armco court and the courts which side with the Armco decision.19, In
support of this view, those courts cite a long history of case law hold-
ing that an insured's cost of complying with an equitable directive of
a governmental agency is not recoverable under a CGL policy.192 In
particular, the case of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Hanna 193 is cited
as precedent for this view.
In Hanna, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a CGL car-
rier is only obligated to indemnify its insured for damages for de-
struction or injury to property.' 94 The Hanna court reasoned that
the CGL policy did not provide coverage for mandatory injunctive
orders because the nature of relief sought was not to compensate for
the destruction of property. 95 To hold otherwise, the Hanna court
concluded, would be to ignore the plain and unambiguous provi-
186. Id. at 1354.
187. See id. at 1353. The Armco court assumes that response actions taken to miti-
gate or prevent environmental damage do not constitute tangible injury to property
under a CGL policy. Id.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 49-84.
189. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23), (24); see also supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text
(describing the nature of removal and remedial actions as measures to mitigate or
prevent environmental damage).
190. See id.
191. See cases cited supra note 181.
192. Id.
193. 224 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1955).
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sions of the CGL contract which stated that the policy covers pay-
ments to third persons who have a legal claim for compensatory
damages against the insured on account of injury to or destruction of
property. 19 6
In addition to following the Hanna court's strict construction of
the CGL policy, the Armco court gave two public policy reasons for
denying coverage for injury actions.l17 The first public policy reason
is that such expenditures are subject to the discretion of the insured.
If the insured has discretion in taking safety precautions, for exam-
ple, and will later be indemnified by his carrier, the carrier loses its
certainty as to the extent of his liability under the policy.' 98 The sec-
ond and less obvious, but perhaps more compelling, public policy
reason is that insureds are far more likely to misusee safety measures
where another party is paying the bill.199 200 "Should [CGL] policies
be construed to cover some forms of harm-avoidance measures," the
Armnco court concluded, "courts would [then] be faced with the very
difficult problem of separating needed prophylactic measures from
unnecessary or inefficient ones."
20 '
III. THE LIBERAL VIEW: THE BETTER OF Two RULES
With either the strict or liberal view, the best argument is the policy
argument. For example, the strict view stresses the artificial distinc-
tion between an insured who is sued for response costs and an in-
sured who will comply with an injunction or order, but seeks
indemnification from its insurer. The problem with focusing on
legal damages resulting from a response cost or administrative en-
forcement suit as the trigger for coverage is that the insured must
wait to be sued, or risk losing coverage for acting before the cover-
age disputes were settled. The insured thus has no incentive to co-
operate or negotiate a settlement agreement with the EPA. The
result is that limited Superfund monies are spent at the worst sites,
while other sites slated for cleanup are put on hold until the EPA can
replenish the Superfund. This scenario undercuts the policy of CER-
CLA: to facilitate prompt cleanup of sites on the NPL.
One commentator points out that the strict view of damages not
only contradicts Superfund policy, but also grants the government
broad discretion through artful pleading in deciding who bears the
cost of cleanup. Although the government may attempt to shift
cleanup costs to the deep pocket polluter, without regard to insur-
196. See id.




201. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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ance coverage, this strategy may ignore the most efficient cost alloca-
tion, which would include insurance coverage of all PRP's.202
As for the strict view, the policy arguments proposed by insurance
companies and adopted by the Armco court are unconvincing. There
are numerous strictly enforced federal and state safety and environ-
mental laws which require corporations to internalize their pollution
costs. The liberal view of damages will not cause corporations to
externalize or over-utilize pollution control measures. Insurance
coverage does not apply to a knowing polluter, nor would a corpora-
tion recoup its pollution control expenses from its insurance
carrier.203
Large corporations, such as Armco, that broker and negotiate a
manuscript CGL policy, should be held to the terms of their contract.
They would, however, internalize response costs by taking preven-
tive measures if it was clear that they did not buy coverage for CER-
CLA liability. The landowner or a small business owner who signs a
CGL form is another matter. The term damages means an obliga-
tion to pay, regardless if it is damages in the technical sense or an
EPA cleanup order or response cost suit.
Courts that adhere to the technical meaning of damages, i.e., legal
compensatory damages, "beg the question because no one can value
the loss to the environment in monetary terms." 2 04 The policy be-
hind CERCLA is to clean up hazardous sites, and as most state and
many federal district courts realize, the value of damage to the prop-
erty is the cost to clean up the site. The measure of damages is the
same, whether couched as equitable or restitutional relief, or as com-
pensation for loss in value to the environment.
CONCLUSION
The restitutional nature of EPA cleanup costs cannot be avoided
because of the nature of the property damage and valuation
problems when there is environmental contamination. The reality is
that no amount of money can replace natural resources which have
been contaminated. The only recourse is to clean up the site as best
as modern technology is able. This is the policy behind CERCLA. If
the artificial distinction between restitution and compensatory dam-
ages were dropped, the polluters, the EPA and the insurance carrier
202. Hapke, Hazardous Waste and Insurance Coverage: The Federal Circuit's Interpreta-
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